|Table of Contents
|Background -- Nike in Asia
|The Ernst & Young Methodology
|Issues Revealed by the Ernst & Young Report
|Lack of Safety Equipment and Training
|Biases in the Audit
|What Ernst & Young Missed
|What Ernst & Young Should Have Analyzed
|Appendix: The Ernst & Young Audit
About the Author
Dara O'Rourke is a research associate at the Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC), and a consultant to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vietnam. His research focuses on strategies for preventing adverse environ mental and social impacts of industrial activities. He has been conducting research in Vietnam for the last three years. Mr. O'Rourke has worked as a consultant to the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Bank, and the U.S. Environmental Prote ction Agency. Mr. O'Rourke has a Bachelors degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Mechanical Engineering and Political Science, and a Masters degree from the Energy and Resources Group at the University of California, Berkeley. He is c urrently completing his Ph.D. at Berkeley.
About Transnational Resource & Action Center (TRAC)
TRAC works to help build global links for social justice, ecological sustainability and corporate accountability. Its web site, Corporate Watch --- www.corpwatch.org ---, provides news, information, analysis for the general public about the role corpora tions play in social political, economic and environmental issues in the U.S. and around the world. TRAC is a project of The Tides Center.
Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC)
Presidio Building 1016
P.O. Box 29344
San Francisco CA 94129
Tel: (415) 561-6568
Fax: (415) 561-6493
Production Coordinated by Sara Wood
David Atkin, Jeff Ballinger, Nikki Bas, Robert Bray, Andre Carothers, Thuyen Nguyen, John B. Pike, Amit Srivastava.
Exclusive photographs, the first independent pictures taken inside a Nike factory in Vietnam, will be available on the Corporate Watch Web Site after
November 10th. This report and the entire Ernst & Young Audit will
also be available.
As public scrutiny of sweatshops in the apparel industry continues to
grow, one of the central issues under discussion is how the global
operations of U.S. corporations such as Nike can best be monitored to
certify decent and healthy working conditions.
Indeed, the White House Apparel Industry Partnership, which is due to
make a series of recommendations to President Clinton in November, is
currently debating two sides of this question. On the one hand,
corporations on the task force such as Nike argue that accounting firms
like Ernst and Young are best qualified to serve as monitors by carrying
out labor and environmental audits. On the other hand, labor, religious
and human rights organizations insist that independent, publicly
accountable monitors w ould be best qualified to undertake this task.
This debate, however, has been fundamentally flawed by the fact that
the public, and most of the members of the task force, have never seen
an audit of labor or health and safety conditions produced by an
TRAC is pleased to be able to shed some light on this subject by
releasing the first audit of this kind ever to be made public: a
confidential Ernst and Young assessment of the Tae Kwang Vina plant, a
factory which employs 9,200 workers who produce 400,00 0 pairs of shoes
a month exclusively for Nike in Vietnam.
We are also happy to make public the first photos independently taken
inside a Nike plant in Vietnam.
Furthermore, we are proud to publish TRAC Research Associate Dara
O'Rourke's report, Smoke From A Hired Gun, an analysis and critique of
the Ernst and Young audit.
Mr. O'Rourke is a consultant to the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO), and has conducted research in over 50
factories in Vietnam. One of them was the Tae Kwang Vina factory, a Nike
subcontractor in the Dong Nai province of Viet nam, and the subject of
the Ernst and Young audit. Mr. O'Rourke visited this factory three times
in 1997. During the visits to the plant, he performed walk-through
audits of environmental and working conditions, interviewed management
personnel, met wit h Tae Kwang Vina's managing director, and with
representatives of Nike Inc. in Vietnam. He also interviewed workers
confidentially outside the factory--something that Ernst and Young
failed to do.
Ernst and Young found Nike's subcontractor to be in violation of a
number of Vietnamese labor and workplace environmental laws. This
finding is in contradiction to Ernst & Young's own conclusion that
Tae Kwang Vina is in compliance with the Nike "Code of Conduct."
Furthermore, Mr. O'Rourke found Ernst and Young's methodology to be
highly deficient, having ignored "most accepted standards of labor
and environmental auditing." Mr. O'Rourke's assessment, including
his interviews with workers, reveal a far worse situat ion in the Nike
plant than Ernst and Young portrays.
Indeed, Ernst and Young's incompetence as a social and environmental
auditor, combined with Mr. O'Rourke's own findings inside the plant,
present a strong argument against using accounting firms to conduct
labor and environmental audits.
We hope these reports will serve as a constructive contribution to
the effort to eliminate sweatshops around the world.
China Brotsky, Chair of the Board, Transnational Resource & Action Center (TRAC)
Joshua Karliner, Executive Director, Transnational Resource & Action Center (TRAC)
The Ernst & Young Audit
- A confidential Ernst & Young audit of labor and environmental
conditions inside a Nike factory in Vietnam was recently leaked to the
Transnational Resource & Action Center (TRAC).
- This is the first time that an accounting firm's labor and
environmental audit of any apparel company has ever been made public.
- The question of whether firms such as Ernst & Young are
competent to monitor the shoe and garment industry is currently under
discussion by the White House Apparel Industry Partnership.
- An examination of the Ernst & Young audit raises serious
questions about the legitimacy and competence of accounting firms' as
independent monitors of labor and environmental issues.
- TRAC is also releasing the first photos taken independently inside
a Nike factory in Vietnam.
- The Ernst & Young audit also sheds light on, and raises
questions about the findings of Andrew Young, the former UN Ambassador
hired to evaluate Nike's "Code of Conduct."
Ernst & Young on the Conditions inside this Nike Factory
- The Ernst & Young report, which Andrew Young claimed to have
access to, shows that Nike's "Code of Conduct," even when
followed, allows dangerous working conditions to persist in its
- Although flawed in a number of ways, the audit notes continuing
violations of labor laws on maximum working hours, unprotected
chemical exposures, poor treatment of workers, and management control
of the trade union.
- Among the factory's 9,200 workers who produce 400,000 pairs of
mid- to high-end Nike shoes per month, the audit reports high levels
of respiratory illnesses in sections with high chemical use.
- The audit determined that even though Tae Kwang Vina Company (the
subcontractor in question) violates Vietnamese labor and environmental
laws, it is at the same time in compliance with Nike's "Code of
- Tae Kwang Vina is reportedly the most technically advanced of
Nike's subcontractors in Vietnam.
TRAC's Findings on the Conditions inside this Nike Factory
Confidential interviews with employees outside of the factory
provided information about numerous violations of Nike's Code of Conduct
that were not discovered by the Ernst & Young audit, including:
- Violations of Vietnamese labor laws on pay;
- Violations of Vietnamese labor laws on maximum overtime hours;
- Forced overtime;
- Strike breaking; and,
- Physical and verbal abuse of workers.
Shortcomings of the Ernst & Young Audit
- The audit is missing information regarding occupational health and
safety, environment, and general working conditions.
- The methodology employed by Ernst & Young ignores most
accepted standards of labor and environmental auditing. For example,
the audit involved no monitoring or sampling of air quality in the
- Most of the data came directly from management sources.
- The audit overlooks many of the key issues of concern in Nike
plants around Asia, including: physical and verbal abuse of workers,
sexual harassment, repercussions for attempts to organize, and
Relevance to the White House Task Force
- This audit highlights how important issues can be covered up or
ignored in "independent monitoring." Some form of public
disclosure is critical to insuring the quality of auditing.
- The audit provides a strong argument against using accounting
firms to conduct labor and environmental audits.
- The poor quality of this audit argues for truly independent
monitoring of Nike plants. Labor, religious, or human rights
organizations that pass an accreditation program would be more
Background -- Nike in Asia
Nike, Inc., the world's largest retailer of athletic shoes, has come
under increasing criticism recently over working conditions in its
factories in Asia. Labor and human rights groups have reported physical
and verbal abuse of workers, hazardous working conditions, pennies per
hour wages, and anti-union efforts throughout Indonesia, China, and
Vietnam, where Nike employs over 350,000 workers.1 Nike's treatment of
its workers stands in stark contrast to the record $795 million in
profits it reported thi s year.2
Nike initially responded to public criticisms by claiming no control
over the conditions inside the factories making its shoes and clothing.
Nike argued that as the company does not own any of the factories
producing its products, Nike could not influenc e working conditions or
pay.3 Labor rights groups have challenged this claim, demanding that
Nike take responsibility for its subcontractors' actions.
Nike has since changed its strategy. First it hired two public
accounting firms, Ernst & Young and Price Waterhouse, to perform
internal audits of the labor and environmental practices inside its
subcontractors. Nike describes the Ernst & Young audits a s "systematic, unannounced evaluations by independent auditors"4 of current working conditions inside their factories.
Second, it hired former UN-Ambassador Andrew Young's consulting firm
GoodWorks International LLC, to review the company's "Code of
Conduct" and subcontractor compliance. Andrew Young's report, which
largely exonerated Nike, was made public and followed u p with a PR
campaign. The much more in-depth internal audits however, which Andrew
Young claimed to have access to, have remained completely confidential.
These "independent audits" are now central to debates
around improving conditions inside the globally dispersed subcontractors
of US firms. A White House commission is currently examining the issue
of independent auditing.5 Nike and other apparel compan ies in the
commission argue that corporations should be able to employ their own
accounting firms to perform these audits. Labor, religious, and human
rights groups however, disagree, arguing that truly independent auditing
is critical to the task of end ing sweatshops around the world. A truly
informed discussion of the issue has been limited by the fact that
audits by these accounting firms have never been made public.
Until now, without evidence on the quality of accounting firm audits,
it was impossible to determine whether these firms could, or would, do
an adequate job of labor and environmental auditing. However, just this
month, an Ernst & Young audit of one Nike subcontractor - the Tae
Kwang Vina Company, a Korean manufacturer operating in Vietnam - was
leaked to TRAC. Tae Kwang Vina employs 9,200 workers, and produces more
than 400,000 pairs of Nike's mid- to high-end athletic shoes per month.
This audit offe rs a rare opportunity to examine the methodology,
findings, and recommendations of an industry auditor.
The Ernst & Young Methodology
While their methodology is not explicitly presented, Ernst &
Young explain that "the procedures we have performed were those
that you [Nike] specifically instructed us to perform. Accordingly, we
make no comment as to the sufficiency of these procedures for your
purposes." As this statement makes clear, Ernst & Young did not
perform an "independent" audit, but rather simply followed
The Ernst & Young auditors spent approximately one week in the
Tae Kwang Vina factory.6 They relied largely on management information
about working conditions, organizational practices, and wages to write
their report. They performed no environmental mo nitoring or air
sampling of their own. Occupational health and safety information came
entirely from secondary sources (largely Vietnamese government
agencies). Information on worker perceptions and attitudes came from a
survey of 50 employees "randomly selected...from the payroll
The Ernst & Young report, taken on its own, is poorly written,
fraught with errors, and convoluted in structure. As discussed below,
the audit methodology and reporting fail to adhere to the conventions of
occupational health and safety, or environmental auditing. Ernst &
Young's audit procedures appear simply to be based on Nike's
Issues Revealed by the Ernst & Young Report
Despite methodological flaws, the report does come to a number of
striking conclusions about the working conditions inside Tae Kwang Vina.
- From a "sample of 165 employees from Mixing, P.U., Roller
sections, there are 128 employees (77.57%) getting respiratory
disease..." (E&Y Page 9. References in this section are to
the Ernst & Young Report which is included as an Appendix.)
- "Dust in the Mixing Shop exceeded the standard 10 times."
(E&Y Page 8) This dust includes resins that are potentially very
hazardous because they cause respiratory ailments.
- Toluene concentrations "exceeded the standard from 6 to 177
times" in several sections of the factory. (E&Y Page 8)
Toluene is a chemical solvent that is known to cause central nervous
system depression, damage to the liver and kidneys, and skin and eye
- Chemical releases have led to an "increasing number of
employees who have disease [sic] involving skin, heart, allergic,
[and] throat working in chemical involved sections." (E&Y
- Acetone concentrations "exceeded the standard 6 to 18 times."
(E&Y Page 8)
Lack of Safety Equipment and Training
- "Personal protective equipment (gloves, masks) are not daily
provided. (E&Y Page 4) Workers "do not wear protective
equipment...even in highly-hazardous places where the concentration of
chemical dust, fumes exceeded the standard frequently." (E&Y
P age 6)
- "There are [sic] no training on proper handling of chemicals
for related employees in daily exposed [sic] to chemicals." (E&Y
- Workers are punished or fined for "violating code of section
such as talking during working hours." (E&Y Page 3)
- "40 workers [out of 50] do not read NIKE's Code of Conduct
[and] even do not know exactly what NIKE is." (E&Y Attachment
II, Page 2)
- "48 cases [out of 50] where workers were required to work
above the maximum working hours." (E&Y Page 2)
It is interesting to note that even with these findings Andrew Young
concluded that Nike was doing a "good job." This would indicate
that either Andrew Young was not shown all of the internal audits Nike
commissioned, or he has a very different view of a "good job"
than would most occupational health and safety specialists.
Biases in the Audit
The Ernst & Young audit methodology results in biased findings on
a number of critical issues. For example, posing a question about pay
without guaranteeing protection from repercussions, can discourage
candid answers, and is likely to lead to a biased a nalysis. As a
consultant to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization in
Vietnam, I visited the Tae Kwang Vina plant three times during 1997. I
also interviewed workers in confidence away from the factory. My
research paints a very differe nt picture than the Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young asserts:
"40 workers [out of 50 interviewed] are satisfied with
their salary," which officially starts at $40 per month, although
new workers are paid a lower "training wage". (E&Y
Attachment 2, Page 2)
This finding highlights one of the problems with Ernst &
Young's interview method. In my research, not one of the workers I spoke
with at Tae Kwang Vina (including office staff) was "satisfied"
with their pay.
Ernst & Young:
"46 workers opined that working overtime hours are
acceptable while 4 workers do not appreciate working overtime." (E&Y
Attachment 2, Page 2)
This statement ignores the deeper rationale for working
overtime - base salaries are extremely low. Tae Kwang Vina pays one of
the lowest base salary of any of the 50 large factories I have studied
Ernst & Young:
Only "15 workers are not satisfied with the working
conditions (hot, stuffy)." (E&Y Attachment 2, Page 2)
The workers I spoke with complained about working
conditions, including heat, chemical exposures, poor ventilation, forced
overtime, and verbal abuse by managers.
Ernst & Young:
"There's a high rate of labor accidents caused by
carelessness of employees." (E&Y Page 7)
A serious occupational health and safety audit would analyze
the underlying causes of accidents - such as the absence of training and
hazard prevention programs - rather than simply blaming the victims. To
attribute accidents to carelessness rather than working conditions
without thorough analysis is another example of bias in the audit.
Ernst & Young:
The audit notes that "the workers trade union is still
being organized by the management and the workers." (E&Y Page
Workers report that leaders of the trade union were selected
and paid by Tae Kwang Vina's management.7
What Ernst & Young Missed
In my interviews with employees,8 I was given information about
numerous violations of Nike's Code of Conduct that were not discovered
by the Ernst & Young audit. I was informed that managers of Tae
Kwang Vina have:
- Violated Vietnamese labor laws on maximum overtime hours.
Night-shift workers in the stitching section told me that their "standard"
work week is 10.5 hours per day, six days per week. This basic work
week can lead to 700 or more overtime hours per year, well over the
legal maximum of 200 overtime hours per year.;
- Forced overtime. Workers complained that they have no choice in
whether or not they work overtime. Workers are told one day in advance
that they must work overtime. If they "choose" not to work
overtime more than twice, they are likely to be fired .;
- Violated Vietnamese labor laws on pay. Tae Kwang Vina is required
to pay increasing wages based on workers' skills. Workers at skill
level 1 should be paid the minimum wage ($40/month) times a
multiplier, skill level 2 should be paid $40 times a hi gher
multiplier, etc. One staff member told me the company ignores this
legal requirement, giving annual salary increases much lower than
- Broken strikes. Tae Kwang Vina management have repeatedly
threatened to fire all workers who wouldn't return to work during
strikes over the last two years. An office staff member explained that
"managers investigate who incited the action, and don 't fire
them, but make them change jobs, and treat them very badly until they
- Physically and verbally abused workers. I was told numerous
stories about managers hitting workers. Reportedly, in one case the
director of security hit a Vietnamese guard. In another case, a
manager hit several women workers with a broom while tr ying to force
them to leave the factory in a single file line.
- Sexual harassment. Several workers told me that a Korean manager
allegedly attempted to rape two women workers last year, and then fled
the country. This was widely reported in the Vietnamese press.9
Independent monitors on the ground in Vietnam wou ld have been aware
of this case and would have followed up on these issues.
Tae Kwang Vina is the most technically advanced of Nike's
subcontractors in Vietnam, and according to Nike is no worse on labor or
environmental issues than the other four Nike factories in Vietnam.10 In
fact, Tae Kwang Vina received the highest score of Nike's five factories
in Vietnam in a self-assessment procedure.11
The serious omissions and biases in the Ernst & Young findings
point out the weaknesses of using accounting firms to audit labor and
environmental practices. These auditors are not trusted by workers, and
their findings are never submitted to public scru tiny.
What Ernst & Young Should Have Analyzed
In following Nike's instructions for the audit, Ernst & Young
failed to comprehensively analyze labor and environmental conditions
inside the Tae Kwang Vina factory. The audit is missing important
information regarding occupational health and safety, env ironment, and
general working conditions. An audit should be designed to determine
normal operating practices within a factory, to evaluate recognized
hazards and how they are controlled, and to analyze how new hazards are
identified and controlled.12 I n order to do all this, auditors need to
be trained in hazard recognition, and must be able to independently
assess management actions. Ernst & Young failed to adequately
analyze both existing hazards and procedures for resolving new hazards.
An Industrial Hygienist who performs worker health and safety
compliance inspections for the State of California13 noted that if Tae
Kwang Vina had been operating in the U.S., it would have been cited and
fined on numerous counts, including:
- chemical over-exposures;
- inadequate ventilation;
- noise over-exposures;
- lack of personal protective equipment;
- absence of a hazard communication program;
- lack of job-specific training for operating machinery; and,
- lack of drinking water in high heat stress environments.
The Ernst & Young audit failed to examine any of these issues in
detail, and ignored exposures to other hazardous chemicals such as Methyl
Ethyl Ketone and glues in the plant. The audit also failed to examine why
employees with respiratory illnesses were still working in areas of
exposure without controls, and why no safety committee exists in a factory
with 9,200 workers.
The audit should have also examined issues that are common points of
concern in Nike plants around Asia, and that have been specifically
raised at the Tae Kwang Vina plant. Workers should have been interviewed
off-site with guaranteed anonymity regarding physical and verbal abuse
by managers, sexual harassment, general working conditions, and pay
issues. Lora Jo Foo, Managing Attorney for the Asian Law Caucus and
President of Sweatshop Watch, asserts that "it is impossible to do
an analysis of minimum w age or overtime compensation without having
information on the actual hours worked, and the take-home pay of the
workers, both of which were missing from the Ernst & Young audit. A
proper analysis would involve unannounced monitoring of working hours,
an d interviews with workers away from the factory."14
The environmental section of the Ernst & Young audit similarly
misses most of the key environmental issues in this factory. At a
minimum the audit should have listed all chemicals used in the plant,
noted that burning scrap rubber in the factory's boiler s is violating
Vietnamese environmental laws, and proposed alternatives to burning
A truly independent audit of labor and environmental practices would
involve a more complete analysis of the system within the factory which
affects working conditions, health and safety, and the environment. This
includes: management policies and action s, company organization, worker
training, hazard prevention programs, and existing and potential
physical and mental hazards. A long-term auditing program would also
include comprehensive health studies of workers in hazardous sections of
the plant. This type of audit obviously requires well trained auditors
that are committed to independent analysis of the conditions inside the
Dusty Kidd, Nike's Director of Labor Practices, proclaims that Nike
will "Assure best practices in every factory where NIKE products
are made, regardless of who owns the factory, or the scale and duration
of our presence there."15 Furthermore, Nike cla ims that "When
NIKE leads, others follow. We're the leader -- always have been, always
will be."16 Despite these bold claims, the leaked Ernst & Young
audit provides evidence that working conditions can hardly be described
as "best practices" in a facto ry which is said to be Nike's
most technically advanced plant in Vietnam.
The Ernst & Young audit also presents a strong argument that
accounting firms retained by manufacturers are not the appropriate
organizations to be conducting audits of labor and environmental
conditions. Accounting firms such as Ernst & Young simply do not
have the training, independence, or the trust of workers, to perform
comprehensive, unbiased audits of working conditions. We agree with a
State of California health and safety compliance officer who argues in
an industry newsletter that "putting the fox's paid consultant in
charge of the hen house" is not the solution.17 It is also clear
from the leaked audit that Andrew Young's report on Nike failed to
examine many of the critical issues related to labor and environmental
conditions in Nike plants.
The information presented in this audit represents only the tip of
the iceberg of poor working conditions inside Nike and other US
subcontractor factories around the world. For instance, there have been
widespread reports in the Vietnamese press about si milar conditions in
other Nike plants.18 A recent investigative report from China documents
serious problems in Nike and Reebok plants there.19 Nike's Indonesian
factories have been criticized for their mistreatment of workers for
If Nike genuinely wishes to improve the conditions inside its plants,
it would, as the saying goes, "Just Do It." The company should
make public all of the internal audits conducted to date. This would
shed light on current conditions in its plants, and increase the
public's belief that Nike is making a good faith effort to improve.
Clearly only well-trained, independent auditors can perform the types
of audits that are needed in Nike's factories. As The New York Times
admits, a better alternative to accounting firms would be "local,
truly independent monitors who speak the language , can make unannounced
visits and enjoy the trust of a largely young, female...workforce."21
Labor, religious, or human rights groups that pass an accreditation
program would be the best candidates for this job.
- Dottie Enrico, "Women's Groups Pressure Nike on Labor
Practices," USA TODAY, October 27, 1997, Pg. 2B; Jon Frandsen, "Nike
Invited to Answer Charges of Third World Exploitation," Gannett
News Service, October 24, 1997; Brad Knickerbocker, "Nike Fight s
Full-Court Press on Labor Issue," The Christian Science Monitor,
September 23, 1997; Jonathan Make, "Critics: Young Report Just
Doesn't Do It," Business Journal-Portland, June 27, 1997.
- PRNewswire, "Nike Reports Record Fourth Quarter and Fiscal
1997 Earnings," July 1, 1997, Beaverton, Ore.
- Donald Katz, Just Do It: The Nike Spirit in the Corporate World,
New York: Random House, 1994. Katz quotes one Nike representative as
saying "We don't pay anybody at the factories and we don't set
policy within the factory; it is their business to r un."
- See Nike's web page www.nikeworkers.com.
- The Apparel Industry Partnership was created by the White House in
August 1996. In April 1997, the Partnership presented the President
with a Code of Conduct and Principles of Monitoring. The Partnership
plans to release a second report in November 1 997.
- Personal communication with Nike staff in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam, October 3rd, 1997.
- Interview with Tae Kwang Vina employee, October 7, 1997.
- Interviews were conducted with five Tae Kwang Vina employees in
October, 1997. These employees ranged from high-level office staff to
- The Worker Newspaper (Nguoi Lao Dong), in Vietnamese, August 23,
1996. See also Duc Hung and Huong Lam, "Foreign Bosses Blasted:
Labour Force Abused as Firms Seek Short Cut to Quick Buck,"
Vietnam Investment Review, Ha Noi, March 3-9, 1997.
- Personal communication with Nike staff in Ho Chi Minh City,
Vietnam, October 3rd, 1997.
- Interview with Tae Kwang employee, October 11, 1997.
- Arthur Reich, "Workplace Inspection & Worker Protection,"
in J. LaDou (ed.) Occupational Health & Safety, Itasca, Illinois:
National Safety Council, Second Edition, 1994, PP: 121-161. Elizabeth
Gross and Elise Pechter Morse, "Evaluation," in B.A. Pl og,
J. Niland, and P.J. Quinlan (eds.) Fundamentals of Industrial Hygiene,
Itasca, Illinois: National Safety Council, Fourth Edition, 1996, PP:
- Personal communication with Garrett Brown, MPH, Industrial
Hygienist, Nov. 2, 1997. Mr. Brown is a compliance inspector for the
State of California, and is the National Coordinator of the
Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network.
- Personal communication with Lora Jo Foo, October 31, 1997.
- See Nike's web page www.nikeworkers.com.
- Garrett Brown, "The Slippery Slope of Third-Party Reviews,"
The Synergist, September 15, 1997.
- Articles in Vietnamese and English are available from Vietnam
Labor Watch or on their web site at: http://www.saigon.com/~nike/
- The Asia Monitor Resource Centre and the Hong Kong Christian
Industrial Committee, "Working Conditions in Sports Shoe
Factories in China Making Shoes for Nike and Reebok," Hong Kong,
- David Moberg, "Just Doing It: Inside Nike's New-Age
Sweatshop," L.A. Weekly, June 20, 1997. Jeff Ballinger, "Just
Do It - or Else: Unfair Labor Practices Among Nike Inc.'s Foreign
Suppliers," Multinational Monitor, v16, n6, June 1995.
- New York Times, "Watching the Sweatshops," Editorial, p. A20, August 20, 1997.