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Iraq: Reining In Contractors

The prison scandal in Iraq raises questions about contractor oversight

by Jason Peckenpaugh and Shane HarrisGovernment Executive magazine
June 1st, 2004

When Congress learned that private contractors were implicated in the abuse
of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, legislators turned to
the Pentagon for answers: Why was the military using contract interrogators
to question Iraqi prisoners? Could contractors be prosecuted in U.S. courts?
And, as Sen. Daniel Akaka, D-Hawaii, asked at a May 11 Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, is any government agency responsible for keeping tabs on
all the contractors working in Iraq? Army Maj. Gen. Ronald Burgess, director
of intelligence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted he didn't know.

As the scandal unfolded, other answers were hard to come by. It took days
for the Pentagon to pinpoint which unit oversaw a contract with CACI
International Inc., a technology and network services company based in
Arlington, Va., to provide interrogators. The military's need for contract
support - even for sensitive work such as security and intelligence - long
has been obvious to private firms. For example, at the hearing, Army Lt.
Gen. Keith Alexander admitted the service had only 540 active-duty
interrogators. But far less obvious are the ways the Pentagon is acquiring
such services and the rules under which contractors must operate.

To obtain interrogator services for Abu Ghraib and other detention centers
in Iraq, for example, the Army used a contract intended for the purchase of
information technology services. The procurement was performed on behalf of
the Combined Joint Task Force-7, which at the time had operational control
of troops in Iraq. The National Business Center, a fee-for-service
procurement operation of the Interior Department, did the buying between
August and December of 2003. The center had negotiated an open-ended
purchase agreement against a pre-existing General Services Administration
contract with Premier Technology Group Inc., a technology and intelligence
services firm in Fairfax, Va. The procurement was conducted from the
National Business Center's offices at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., which is also
home to the Army's military intelligence school.

The contract provides a broad range of technology services, including
programming, backup and security, maintenance, facility operations,
computer-aided design and data conversion. It is a GSA information
technology schedule contract, one of thousands awarded to companies GSA
approves for use by government agencies. As the user of the schedule, the
National Business Center had legal responsibility for the administration of
the contract.

The contract first was awarded in 1998 to Premier Technology. CACI bought
that company in May 2003 in order to obtain its expertise in "intelligence
and military operations," according to Jack London, CACI's chairman and
chief executive officer. For CJTF-7, the National Business Center used the
contract to procure interrogators, intelligence support - which included
intelligence gathering and data entry - and "screening cell support," which
a center spokesman defined as "a screening program designed to clear a host
country national for access to U.S. military host country base camps."
CJTF-7 has been replaced by Multinational Force Iraq, which is responsible
for strategic planning, and Multinational Corps Iraq, which is responsible
for tactical operations.

The center's description of the work CACI performed shows only tenuous
connections to technology. For instance, one order for "interrogator
support," issued Aug. 14, 2003, specified "database entry" as part of the
task. Workers defined as "intelligence advisers," "intelligence research
clerks" and "intelligence and technical support" would gather intelligence
and then "update various databases." While that order, worth about $20
million, involved technology devices, another order from Dec. 3, 2003, makes
no mention of technology at all. The order for "HUMINT [human intelligence]
augmentee contractors" called for employees to assist CJTF-7 and its
brigades, and "in performance of HUMINT and counterintelligence missions in
secure and fixed locations." A GSA spokeswoman confirmed that three
intelligence and interrogator orders, collectively worth almost $45 million,
were placed through the CACI schedule. GSA's inspector general has opened an
inquiry into the orders.

For critics of Defense contracting, the lack of transparency created by
third-party procurement is connected to a larger problem: the government's
inability to oversee and regulate the swarms of contractors supporting the
U.S.-led occupation in Iraq. "Pending a thorough investigation . . . all
contracts with civilian firms for functions involving security, supervision
and interrogation of prisoners, should be suspended," wrote Rep. Jan
Schakowsky, D-Ill., in a May 4 letter to President Bush. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld has pledged to develop rules governing contractors providing
security, but it's unclear whether prisoner detention would be covered.
Sixty security firms with 20,000 employees now operate in Iraq.

Defense is working on yet another set of rules for "contractors accompanying
the force," such as Kellogg, Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, the
Houston-based oil industry giant. KBR and other logistics support firms have
been mainstays since the early 1990s, but observers say more guidance is
needed. "Well over a year ago we asked the department to take a look at
this," says Allan Chvotkin, counsel for the Professional Services Council,
which represents several contractors doing business in Iraq. Chvotkin says
guidance on issues such as when contractors can carry weapons and how they
interact with combatant commanders simply wasn't apparent before the 2003
war in Iraq.

But critics say Defense has done little to get a handle on its contractor
workforce, despite repeated warnings that it was growing rapidly in size and
importance without enough oversight. In a March 2002 memorandum, then-Army
Secretary Thomas White said the service lacked data to eliminate
"unnecessary, costly or unsuitable contracted work." He ordered the
collection of data from Army contractors. More than two years later, the
Army has yet to gather any data. "Most of the time . . . has involved
compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act process," says an Army official.

As the line between contractors and soldiers blurs in Iraq, observers say
the need for rules governing contractors is urgent. Says Dan Guttman, a
contracting expert at Johns Hopkins University, "There has been a stunning
failure to come to grips with the fundamental legal and policy issues raised
by such extensive contracting."



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